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Abstract
Recent theoretical models postulate that only the most productive ￿rms become exporters
due to the existence of costs of exporting. Empirical evidence does suggest that exporters
are on average more productive than their domestic counterparts. However, contrary to the
theory the productivity distribution for exporters and non-exporters overlaps. Motivated by
this empirical ￿nding, I extend an existing model of heterogeneous ￿rms by adding endoge-
nous trade policy based on a political economy argument. Using Ukrainian data I identify
￿rms that receive explicit government support in the form of preferential tax policy, subsi-
dies and other exclusive bene￿ts. I ￿nd that explicit political support is positively associated
with ￿rms size, voter turnout and state ownership but not e¢ ciency.
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11 Introduction
A growing number of studies have been looking into how globalization has been a⁄ecting eco-
nomic agents at the micro level. Earlier theoretical work related to so-called "new trade theory"
treated all ￿rms within a sector as homogenous. Globalization then would a⁄ect all ￿rms in the
same way. However, empirical research at the ￿rm level has shown that ￿rms are very di⁄erent
even within narrowly de￿ned 4-digit NACE industries. Di⁄erences in performance have been
often driven by whether ￿rms serve only the domestic market or also export their products.
Challenged by this empirical evidence on diversity among ￿rms,1 a number of theoretical mod-
els featuring heterogeneous ￿rms have been developed. Melitz (2003) introduces heterogeneity
among producing agents by assuming that ￿rms di⁄er by their productivity drawn randomly
from a given distribution. Prior to the revelation of their productivity, ￿rms have to incur ￿xed
costs of entry. Once the productivity draws are realized, ￿rms make a decision on whether to
stay in the market given the estimated present value of the pro￿t stream. Since all ￿rms face the
same ￿xed costs of entry, only ￿rms with productivity above a certain threshold will stay in the
market. The Melitz model allows to study the implications of trade policy on ￿rm performance.
If there are no trade costs, trade is equivalent to an increase in the size of the closed economy,
which does not a⁄ect ￿rm-level outcomes. However, if entry into a foreign market is associated
with some ￿xed costs as well, only the most productive ￿rms will serve both the domestic and
foreign markets. Trade liberalization will a⁄ect aggregate productivity in the economy by forcing
the least productive ￿rms out of the market and shifting market shares towards more productive
￿rms (i.e. a reallocation e⁄ect). Melitz and Ottaviano (2007) advance the possibility of variation
among ￿rms by allowing for changing elasticities of substitution between di⁄erentiated goods.
In these models, only the most productive ￿rms within an industry become exporters, that is
￿rms are partitioned according to the productivity cuto⁄ levels. Bernard et al. (2003) use a
modi￿ed version of the Ricardian model of stochastic comparative advantage also to explain
the link between exporting, size, and productivity. Similar to the previous models, they assume
the existence of the "iceberg" costs of exporting, which allow only more productive ￿rms (those
with the least marginal costs) to sell to other countries. In another model, Bernard et al. (2007)
follow Melitz (2003) by combining monopolistic competition and unit costs that depend on ￿rm
productivity. In addition to heterogeneity among ￿rms, in their model industries are character-
ized by di⁄erent factor intensities, while the relative abundance of factors of production varies
across countries. Helpman et al. (2004) study the e⁄ect of ￿rm heterogeneity on their decision
whether to export or set up a subsidiary (engage in foreign direct investment, FDI). Since the
latter is associated with higher ￿xed costs, ￿rms will endogenously sort into domestic, exporting
or FDI according to their productivity level.
As summarized by Baldwin (2005), two main features of the ￿ new￿new trade theory are:
(1) ￿rms have di⁄erent marginal costs within the same sector and (2) there exist ￿xed costs
1For an extensive survey of micro-level evidence on the link between foreign market activities, trade policy and
￿rm productivity see Tybout (2003); for developing countries and countries in transition, see Epifani (2003).
2of entry to both domestic and foreign markets. The main implications of these models suggest
that: (a) exporters should signi￿cantly di⁄er from non-exporting ￿rms in terms of productivity
due to high cost of exporting; (b) access to a bigger market should lead to an improvement
in productivity; and (c) trade liberalization should foster reallocation of market shares towards
more productive ￿rms.
The more recent trade models look at the interaction between decisions to go internationally
and to innovate. Lileeva and Tre￿ er (2007) model ￿rms￿decisions to export and innovate using a
heterogeneous response model and test it on a Canadian dataset. They ￿nd that new exporters
increased their productivity by adopting product-innovative technology. Costantini and Melitz
(2008) develop a model where ￿rms make joint decisions to export and innovate once they chose
to enter the domestic market. Firms invest in R&D in anticipation of trade liberalization, and
such innovation results in a one-time shift in productivity draws. Though these models generate
partition of ￿rms into a larger number of groups within an industry (those that sell domestically
and innovate, export and innovate, etc.), similarly to the earlier models, they imply the existence
of clear thresholds of productivity to determine ￿rms￿exporting status.
The mentioned above implication does not seem to be consistent with the recent empirical
evidence. Several papers have found that though on average exporters are more productive than
non-exporters, there are ranges of productivity at which both exporters and non-exporters exist.
For example, Calderon-Madrid and Voicu (2005) using data on Mexican manufacturing ￿rms
￿nd that there is minimum threshold above which ￿rms may be exporters or sell domestically
only, which is in contrast to prediction of the theoretical models on a sharp cut-o⁄. Moreover,
domestic ￿rms seem to outperform exporting ￿rms in some industries such as chemicals, tex-
tiles and metals with average productivity among exporters below the average productivity of
the domestic ￿rms. Besedina (2008) identi￿es di⁄erences in the overlap between productivity
distributions of two groups across sectors in the Ukrainian manufacturing. Similarly to Mex-
ican manufacturing, the di⁄erences between the exporting and non-exporting groups are less
pronounced in metals and textiles.
Several other papers reveal overlap in the productivity distributions among exporting and
non-exporting groups without drawing special attention to this fact2. The extent of overlap
di⁄ers across countries: while in Japan and Spain the productivity distribution of the exporting
￿rms seems to be shifted to the right relative to the domestically selling ￿rms, two distribu-
tions almost overlap in Chilean manufacturing (Tekin, 2008) and in Mexican manufacturing
(Calderon-Madrid and Voicu, 2005).
Motivated by this ￿nding, I extend a trade model of heterogeneous ￿rms developed by
Melitz and Ottaviano (2007) by adding endogenous trade policy induced by a political economy
argument. I show that the presence of exogenous subsidies creates a region in the productivity
distribution where both exporters and non-exporters are present, as observed in my data.3
2See, for example, Wakasugi and Tanaka (2009) for Japan and Caldera (2009) for Spain.
3Although I use the word ￿ subsidy￿ , it does not restrict trade policy to this tool only . For example, Faccio
(2004) investigates political connections between ￿rms and government o¢ cials and ￿nds it as a wide-spread
3Next I endogenize trade policy by adding an electoral competition stage. In particular, I use
a probabilistic voting model as in Persson and Tabellini (2000) with two competing candidates.
Using data on the Ukrainian metallurgical enterprises and Ukrainian legislation, I am able to
identify ￿rms that received explicit government support in the form of tax exemptions, writing
o⁄ accrued arrears, granting tax payment deferment in my dataset. In line with the model
predictions, I show that supported plants di⁄er from non supported by several characteristics. I
also show that in the presence of government interventions, conventionally estimated TFP may
not re￿ ect true economic e¢ ciency, thus leading to an overlap in productivity distributions of
exporters and non-exporters, since political support alters the productivity ranking of the ￿rm
that would have prevailed in the intervention-free world.
The paper is organized as follows: next section presents theoretical model motivated by
empirical ￿ndings discussed above. Section 3 describes the data I use to test model predictions.
I conclude with ￿nal remarks.
2 From empirics to the theory: possible explanation
Recently, several theoretical papers tried to reconcile with empirical evidence on distributions
overlap. For example, Eaton et al. (2008) to reconcile with the overlap evidence add ￿rm and
market speci￿c ￿xed cost along with demand shocks while Irarrazabal and Opromolla (2009) try
to explain the overlap by introducing di⁄erent levels of productivity at which ￿rms start and
stop exporting activity. The observed evidence of a certain overlap in the productivity distrib-
ution of exporters versus non-exporters, as well as the heterogeneous patterns across countries
could be explained, in my view, by the presence of government interventions aimed at supporting
exporting ￿rms in some industries. This idea would be also consistent with the fact that in de-
veloping and transition economies which are more prone to undertake government interventions
exporters do not di⁄er much in terms of productivity from their domestic counterparts.
Implicit and explicit support is a well documented fact for Ukrainian economy, in particular.
Legeida (2001) provides a classi￿cation of implicit and explicit subsidies in the Ukrainian econ-
omy. According to her estimates, the most heavily cross-subsidized industries in the Ukrainian
economy in late 90s early 00s were mining, ferrous metals, machine building and agriculture.
Eremenko and Lisenkova (2002) note that policy tools used to support metallurgical sector
range from implicit subsidies (debt write-o⁄s, inter-enterprise soft budget constraints, cross-
subsidization by lower prices for intermediate goods) to explicit ad-valorem subsidies, the latter
being granted mainly to large exporters. They estimate that these subsidies amounted to around
USD 500 millions during 2000-2001. 4
phenomenon with the varying magnitude across countries. Khwaja and Mian (2005) identify government support
to Pakistani ￿rms as the volume of funds available and preferential borrowing rates.
4Government interventions skyrocketed even more during the recent crisis. In October 2008 almost every news
bloc on Ukrainian TV opened with a report on the meeting of the Prime Minister with the representatives of
di⁄erent industries: metallurgy, chemicals, construction and others. The scenario of the meeting was the same:
the representatives asked for the state support to overcome crisis consequences and every time the support was
4How does the latter relate to the exporting status of a ￿rm? Serving foreign markets is often
associated with signi￿cant costs associated with setting up local o¢ ces or/and dealer networks.
As governments are often concerned with promoting exports (e.g. to boost economic growth)5,
they try to achieve this goal with speci￿c trade policy measures. International trade theory does
not have a clear answer whether an active trade policy is desirable from the welfare point of view.
Baldwin (1992) contrast the implications of the traditional trade theory assuming competitive
markets with the new trade theory under imperfect competition. While the earlier stream of
trade theory does not advocate for intensive government intervention, later contributions to
trade theory which borrowed tools from the Industrial Organization literature (e.g. Brander
and Spencer, 1985) postulated the possibility of strategic trade policy. They argued that if ￿rms
of two countries are competing in a third country market, which is imperfectly competitive,
governments by means of trade policy (subsidy, tax, tari⁄) can ensure higher pro￿ts for domestic
exporting ￿rms at the expense of the other countries￿exporting ￿rms.6
Linking the possibility of strategic trade policy by the government to the analysis of perfor-
mance of exporting ￿rms, in the next section I present a model that tries to explain the two
previously discussed empirical ￿ndings. I introduce export as an exogenous shock to the ￿rm￿ s
pro￿ts in the original Melitz and Ottaviano (2007) model. Next, I incorporate a trade policy
determination stage into the model.
2.1 Open economy with an exogenous subsidy
In this section I present a theoretical model that follows Melitz and Ottaviano (2007). The con-
sumer side of the economy is represented by identical L consumers with quasi-linear preferences
over the numeraire good (qc























In this setup consumers￿preferences are characterized by di⁄erent degrees of substitutability
between numeraire good and di⁄erentiated goods (￿ and ￿) as well as by the degree of product
di⁄erentiation among the latter goods (varieties) denoted by ￿.7





The standard maximization yields the following inverse demand for a variety i assuming that
promised.
5As discussed below, export was a driving force behind the recent GDP growth in Ukraine (Figure 1).
6Brander (1995) makes an overview of the existing trade literature dealing with strategic trade policy. He
shows that optimal trade policy crucially depends on the underlying assumptions about the market structure
(oligopoly, duopoly, Bertrand versus Cournot) and type of the competition (third market or reciprocal markets).
7Though the functional form is crucial for the Melitz and Ottaviano analysis of the e⁄ect of trade liberalization,
it is not detrimental for analysis that follows.
5qc
o > 0:





idi is the aggregate consumption of di⁄erentiated goods in consumer￿ s
bundle.
Then the market demand for a variety i ￿ ￿￿(where ￿￿ is a subset of di⁄erentiated goods s.t.
qc
o > 0) depends on its price (p), size of the market (L), degree of di⁄erentiation among varieties
(￿) and substitutability with a numeraire good (￿ and ￿), number of consumed di⁄erentiated

















The production side of the economy is divided into two sectors: one that produces numeraire
good with constant returns to scale and the other sector dealing with di⁄erentiated goods. Both
sectors use labor as the only input into production. However, while the numeraire sector is
competitive and has free entry, the di⁄erentiated product sector is characterized by costly entry
(fE) since entrants have to incur sunk costs. Investment is a stochastic process with draws
distributed according to some commonly known distribution G(c). Once the draws are realized
each entrant considers whether to stay and produce or exit the market. Since the entry cost is
sunk this decision depends on the entrant￿ s draw of costs and expected future pro￿ts which are
in turn determined by the distribution of productivity in the economy.
The free entry condition for the di⁄erentiated products sector is then given by:
Z cD
o
￿(c)dG(c) ￿ fE = 0 (1)
where cD is a cuto⁄ point for costs, such that ￿rms with costs above it exit the domestic
market. This threshold incorporates the in￿ uence of the average price and number of varieties
(￿rms) on the ￿rms￿pro￿ts (￿), mark-ups (￿), quantities produced (q) and prices charged (p).
The short run equilibrium in this economy is then determined by the free entry condition (1)
and the zero cuto⁄ pro￿t condition cD = p(cD), where p(cD) is a price charge by the ￿rm
with a cuto⁄ level productivity. Then the number of ￿rms in the market is determined by
NE = N=G(cD). Firms can export, but, exporting is costly due to the existence of iceberg-type
trade cost (z > 1). The assumptions on segmented market and constant returns to scale allow
for separate pro￿t functions for domestic and foreign markets.
￿D(c) = [pD(c) ￿ c]qD(c) domestic pro￿ts
￿X(c) = [pX(c) ￿ z￿c]qX(c) export pro￿ts
where ￿ denotes a foreign country.
I concentrate on the short-run perspective implying that all entry has occurred and exit is
6not taking place; therefore, the number of ￿rms and productivity distribution (inverse of the
costs) are ￿xed.8 In this framework subsidy, s; can be considered as an exogenous shock hitting
￿rms￿pro￿ts with a probability ￿ after they have entered the market.9 If some of the ￿rms
receive a subsidy their pro￿ts from export will thus be:
￿X(c) = (pX(c) ￿ z￿c)qX(c) + f(s)
Melitz and Ottaviano parametrize the cost distribution as a Pareto distribution. Given this
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2 (cX ￿ c)2 + f(s) (2)
I assume that subsidy enters ￿rms￿pro￿ts but it does not increase pro￿ts in 1 to 1 ratio.11
An alternative expression in case of a price subsidy will be:
￿X(c) = (pX(c) + f(s) ￿ z￿c)qX(c)
Which is equivalent to the case of subsidy per unit produced:



















For analytical simplicity I will use expression (2), although the derived results will still be
valid for the alternative de￿nitions of subsidy. If we denote with c0
X a cuto⁄ level of costs for
8This assumption seems to be relevant for Ukrainian economy where ine¢ cient plants do continue to "hang
out" in the market either producing little or not producing at all (often selling inventories and renting out ￿xed
assets).
9Without loss of generality I use subsidy in a broad sense as any kind of government intervention a⁄ecting
￿rms pro￿ts.
10For a detailed derivation of the pro￿t functions, see Melitz and Ottaviano (2007).
11Such functional form allows for di⁄erent subsidy alternatives. It should be noted that in Ukraine subsidies
have been granted in the form of tax reductions (e.g. from overall 30% to 9, then 15 for metallurgical sector),
elimination of other levies and fees, writing o⁄ of tax arrears. Also, at some point in time free economic zones
were created which granted tax privileges to speci￿c enterprises.
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The above equality implies that the subsidized group will face lower productivity cuto⁄ to
enter the export market. Therefore, in the region between c0
X and cX (Figure A), some ￿rms
that would not export without subsidy will actually export, while the others with the same level
of productivity but without subsidy will serve only domestic market generating overlap in the
productivity distribution between exporting and non-exporting ￿rms.






If there are bene￿ts from exporting the benevolent government would want to support the
￿rms which are located in the region between the original cuto⁄ and new cuto⁄ to stimulate
exporting. If this explanation is true, in reality we would observe ￿ supported￿group in the
upper middle of the productivity distribution. Once the supported ￿rms are taken out from the
sample, the distributions for exporters and non-exporters would shift further away. However, if
government￿ s choice is not based on e¢ ciency consideration then the subsidy may go to ￿wrong￿



























￿2 = (cX ￿ c)
2 +
2sX
z￿ (cX ￿ c)
8￿rms, that is the ￿rms, which are already exporting or ￿rms which will not reach the new export
cuto⁄ even with the subsidy. Therefore, if the coice of the ￿rms that are supported is not based
on productivity, what we will observe in the data is that once the supported group is taken
out, the productivity distributions may still overlap if government support was given to ￿ wrong￿
￿rms.
Hence the ￿rst hypothesis that I will test in the empirical part is whether exclusion of the
supported ￿rms change the degree of overlap.
If government has other than e¢ ciency concerns, the question is what will determine gov-
ernmental choice who to support in this case? The next section tries to give an answer to this
question using polticial economy argument.
2.2 Open economy with a political economy stage:
There are several approaches that could be used to model the political environment. One of
them is to assume that politicians engage in electoral competition to win the o¢ ce. In this set
up there is no role for organized groups since politicians decide on the policy platform; voters
(groups of voters) in￿ uence policy indirectly via some intrinsic characteristics which ￿attract￿
politicians. That is, voters behave passively without exerting any special e⁄ort (e.g. in the
form of pressure, contributions, bribes) to a⁄ect the policy platform that competing politicians
choose in equilibrium.
The second approach is to introduce organized groups that will actively ￿nd ways to in￿ uence
either probability of winning of their preferred candidate or the policy decision, or both. Gross-
man and Helpman (1994) develop a model of lobbying in the form of campaign contribution to
manipulate trade policy in their preferred direction. In this model the politicians are already in
o¢ ce. Grossman and Helpman (1996) introduce a model where lobbies contributions are aimed
either at the electoral support of a given party or to in￿ uence the choice of policy. Mitra (1999)
models endogenous lobby formation and identi￿es industry features that are associated with a
higher probability of lobbying. In particular, more capital abundant and geographically con-
centrated industries are more likely to form a lobby and, consequently, receive more protection.
More concentrated ownership and less elastic demand for goods produced is also conducive to
lobbying. Using Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobbying model Bombardini (2008) shows that
industries with more dispersed size distribution are more likely to be organized in lobby and
hence will be protected.
I apply probabilistic voting model of electoral competition as in Persson and Tabellini (2000).
In this setup subsidy is chosen by politicians competing for o¢ ce to in￿ uence election outcome.
The choice can be justi￿ed on the grounds that politicians often have motivations for political
favors other than campaign contributions, e.g. vote shares, employment, etc. In my model
voters are grouped according to employment place. Voters can be ideologically biased toward
one of the candidates. I assume that economic policy a⁄ects all voters working at a plant in
the same way. I show that ￿rms with voters that put greater emphasis on economic policy, less
9ideologically biased (with more swing voters), and plants with higher turnout rates among the
workers, will be "attractive" for politicians￿support, and thus will have higher probability of
becoming "politically connected", receive export subsidy or another type of support. Hence my
paper is related to a recent work by Muuls, M. and P. Petropoulou (2006) where the distribution
of economic activity is modelled to a⁄ect trade policy choice when politicians compete for o¢ ce.
The main implication of their model is that industries located in the electoral districts that are
pivotal and have many swing voters are more likely to be protected is empirically con￿rmed for
the US economy.
2.2.1 Setup
There are two parties P = O;R, which try to win o¢ ce. Before the elections two parties choose
a policy vector (trade policy in this case) which they will implement if they are elected. It is
assumed that parties can commit to the policy they announce before the elections.
All voters work at a speci￿c ￿rm and have ideological bias toward one of the parties. The
utility of a voter i working at a ￿rm J is described by the following function:
wiJ = kJWJ(sJ) + (￿iJ + ￿)VR (4)
Where VR = 1 if party R wins election and = 0 otherwise.
kJ is a ￿rm-speci￿c parameter
WJ(sJ) is the e⁄ect of trade policy discussed below
￿iJ is a party bias which is individual-speci￿c,
￿ is a random popularity shock for all voters.














Given the properties of the uniform distribution, the density of individual party shocks for
each plant is summarized by ￿J; and the density for popularity shock is summarized by  .
Firms are also distinguished by the extent to which they care more about economic policy
relative to the ideology, kJ. I assume that economic policy a⁄ects all voters working at the
speci￿c ￿rm in a similar way:
WJ(sJ) = ￿J
D + ￿J




Where as in the previous case ￿J
D is the pro￿ts from selling on domestic market, ￿J
X pro￿t
from exporting, ￿ is a tax, f(sJ) is the extra pro￿ts resulting from the trade policy, as ￿rms can
receive export subsidies or other forms of support from the government and ￿(LJ) is a scaling
factor decreasing in the ￿rm size and representing the economies of scale in the governmental
support.13 Given the government budget constraint, NE￿ =
P
J sJ, the tax rate is determined as
13The scaling factor was ￿rst introduced by Barten (1964) in a household decision model and had been widely
10follows: ￿ = 1
NE
P
J sJ, where NE is the short-run equilibrium number of ￿rms in the economy.
The 2007 snap elections to the Ukrainian Parliament provide some anecdotal evidence on
the validity of the assumption that voters can be grouped by the place they work at. One of
the parties competing for the seat in the parliament showed indeed an interesting pattern of the
votes distribution. Though overall this party did not even reach the required threshold of 3%
to enter Parliament. It managed to get more than 50 and 35 per cent of votes in two electoral
districts in the same city, respectively. Further look at the more detailed information on votes
reveals that even within the two districts the distribution of votes was far away from being
homogenous. According to uno¢ cial information such ￿concentrated￿ support of this party
could be explained by the geographical location of the giant heavy industry plant believed to be
connected to one of the party leaders. The fact is that the party received around 90 thousand
votes in these two districts and the plant o¢ cial￿ s employment in the year before the election
was around 77 thousand employees. De￿nitely, without detailed information on the employment
of the voters one cannot claim that there is a direct link between the two number; however, this
"coincidence" speaks for itself.
The timing is as follows:
1. Two parties simultaneously and noncooperatively decide on the trade policy to ensure
winning of the elections.
2. Voters vote.
3. Policy is implemented.
4. Firms produce and export depending on the implemented trade policy.
2.2.2 Solution
In order to determine equilibrium in the model, we need ￿rst to determine a "swing" voter - a




All voters of ￿rm J with ￿iJ ￿ ￿J would vote for party O.








The vote share that the party O gets given the distributional assumptions is thus:
used in the household literature.

















where tJ is the probability that voters of ￿rm J will turn out to vote and is ￿rm-speci￿c.



























L ￿J is average density across ￿rms. The objective function of the two
parties is symmetrical and consists of two parts: probability of winning election pO and concern
for e¢ ciency ￿. The probability of winning elections, in turn represents a weighted social welfare
function where the voters utility working at a given ￿rm is weighted by the ￿rm size (LJ), their
turnout rate (tJ) and their responsiveness to economic policy (kJ).
MO = ￿pO(sO) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(sO)
Parameter ￿ measures the degree of sel￿shness of the politicians. If it is equal to 1, politicians
only care about winning elections and put no weight on e¢ ciency. On the other hand, if it is
equal to zero politicians have no self-interest. In order to ensure unique policy platform that
maximizes social e¢ ciency I assume that ￿(sP) is a well-behaved function, i.e. di⁄erentiable
and continuous such that ￿0(smin) > 0, ￿0(smax) < 0 and ￿00(sP) < 0 for all sP 2 (smin;smax):
First we consider two extreme cases. When ￿ = 0 politicians behave as a benevolent govern-
ment and o⁄er support to ￿rms based on e¢ ciency.
If ￿ = 1; in equilibrium politicians choose policy platform to maximize their objective func-






















O) is given by (5). Then FOC to the above maximization problem considering




























15Party O wins if it gets at least half of the votes, that is if ￿O ￿
1






































Taking into account properties of the uniform distrubtion this expression becomes (7).




To concentrate on the plant characteristics I assume that voters are ideologically similar












Given the government budget constraint the revenue part is given by L￿: Since subsidies are
costly for the government the government supports only a fraction of ￿rms ￿ with the highest
values of tJkJ:
In the above setup I assumed that every voter is a stakeholder only in the ￿rm he works for,
which is often the case in transition economies.16 As an alternative in the Appendix I derive
results for the case when workers hold a portfolio of stocks of other ￿rms.
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Proposition 1 If ￿ is the same for both parties then in the equilibrium two parties will choose
the same policy platform, which will be determined by the degree of self-interest ￿ and voters￿
characteristics.
Making use of the previous result when ￿ = 1 and the assumptions on the form of ￿(sO),
which ensure a unique vector of the subsidies given to each ￿rm from the e¢ ciency point of
view, the proof of the Proposition 1 is straitforward.17
2.2.3 Model implications
The model generates several testable implications. Politicians will support plants whose pro￿ts
are more responsive to governmental intervention. Equation (10) implies that governmental
support to a given ￿rm J (higher subsidy sJ) increases in voters turnout (tJ) and/or if its voters
16This is especially true for my dataset of open joint stock companies, where many ￿rms have been owned by
the workers and management.
17Nothing prevents a situation when s
I
O = 0 for some I
13care more about economic (trade) policy than ideology (higher kJ). Size of the ￿rm (LJ) enters
the expression (10) indirectly through the scaling factor. Bigger ￿rms will be favored by the
government because of the existence of the economies of scale. This result is di⁄erent from
Persson and Tabellini (2000) where the size of the group does not matter for receiving transfers.
In their model, though votes increase in the group￿ s size, the provision of per capita public
good also makes the bigger groups of voters expensive to "buy". In my model, the subsidy is
given to the ￿rm and though bigger ￿rms receive bigger subsidies, the size of the subsidy is not
determined on per worker basis.
More formally:
H1. In case of low self-interest (low ￿), politicians will support ￿rms with the higher pro-
ductivity among non-exporting ￿rms to enable them to enter foreign market.
H2. Since state-owned plants are usually older and less e¢ cient and ￿nd it di¢ cult to
compete in the market 18, kJ is increasing in the state ownership. As a result, since political
support is increasing in kJ, I should expect higher state share in the subsidized/supported plants.
H3. Firms concentrated in locations with more active voters (higher tJ) are more likely to
receive support.
H4. The size of the plant is expected to positively in￿ uence the probability of receiving
political support.19
H5. Political support changes the productivity distribution by inducing a structural shift for
the politically connected group (Section 2.1).
3 Testing the model: data, speci￿cation and results
The dataset I use for the estimation was assembled from the publicly available annual reports
of the Ukrainian metallurgical companies. The advantage of this dataset is that it covers a
substantial amount of the ￿rm-related information, including ownership, output, stock of capital,
credit position, among other indicators allowing to estimate total factor productivity. The
dataset in use covers the period 2000-2005. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The share of exporters in metallurgy is around 60 per cent of all ￿rms in the industry.
In aggregate, this sector contributed 44.5, 41.4, and 39.7 per cent to the total volume of the
country￿ s exports in 2000, 2001, and 2002, respectively (WB 2005). Around 80 percent of the
exporters in metallurgy shipped to countries outside of the Former Soviet Union.
A speci￿c legislation passed in 1999 in fact established the initiation of an economic ex-
periment aimed "at the increase in production volumes in the metals and mining sectors via
18Previous studies for Ukraine have found state-owned enterprises to be lacking behind in terms of e¢ ciency
and competitiveness (see e.g. Andreyeva (2003), Melnichenko (2002) and Zelenyuk V. and V. Zheka (2004).
19As the recent car industry bail-out in the US has shown that large-scale employment at the car-making plants
was one of the major concerns for the US government when considering the bail-out.
14extension of tax privileges". In particular, tax privileges included writing o⁄ all the tax arrears
that accumulated prior to July 1st 1999.20 It also allowed delays in tax payment up to 36 months
without penalty (zero rate tax credit). The word ￿ experiment￿in the title clearly implied that
tax privileges were granted only to some enterprises in the metallurgical sector. The list of
participants have been slightly modi￿ed in the subsequent years. The experiment was supposed
to end in 2002; however, a new set of legislative acts was adopted to continue with experiment.21
Finally it was abolished in 2005. Thanks to the unique feature of the dataset that allows me
to exactly identify the recipients of one of the forms of the governmental support I can directly
test the implications regarding governmental intervention discussed above.
I can thus construct a variable Support as a binary variable taking values 1 for entire period
if ￿rm was listed in both laws and 0 if was not listed in any. Some plants were added along the
way and some were excluded, hence the variable Support for this groups alternates between 0
and 1.
If Hypothesis H1 is true, then once the supported non-exporting group is taken out from the
sample the degree of overlap will go down, i.e. distribution will be lying further apart. Figure
1 shows two graphs, which depict productivity distributions with and without supported ￿rms.
The graphs look very much alike suggesting that the coice of the supported ￿rms did no seem
to depend on the productivity level. In addition, I compare average productivity of supported
and non-supported group among ￿rms that sold only on domestic market in 200022. I ￿nd that,
there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence between the two groups (Table 2), suggesting that government
choice who to support was indeed driven by other factors.
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 2 about here]
To test Hypothesis H2 I conduct a t-test on equality of means for the variables related to
the state ownership in the two groups of ￿rms in 2000. The variable State ￿ controlled takes
value of 1 if state owns more than 25% of shares in a given ￿rm and 0 otherwise. The variable
State share is a continuos variable denoting direct state ownership. The results of the test for
two variables are presented in Table 3. As expected, I ￿nd that the both the percentage of
state-controlled plants and share, owned by the state, is higher for the plants included in the
experiment and hence bene￿ting from governmental support.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Since the ￿rms in my dataset are open joint stock companies I can identify their location and
match it to an electoral district.23 Ukraine had parliamentary elections in 1998 and presidential
elections in 1999. The ￿rst law on state support of metallurgical ￿rms was passed on July 14th,
20Law of Ukraine on Economic Experiment in Mining and Metals Industry, dated July 14th, 1999.
21Law of Ukraine on Further Stimulation of Mining and Metals Industry, dated January 17th, 2002
22Since I do not have information on the ￿rms in 1999 I use the earliest available year 2000.
23I use legal address to assign ￿rm￿ s voters to electoral district, that is I assume that workers of this ￿rm live
nearby. I claim that this is a plausible assumption given the Soviet history when enterprises, especially large ones,
built their own housing in the surroundings.
151999 via a secret vote. The presidential elections took place in October hence I use data on
voter turnout only for the parliamentary elections of 1998 to test Hypothesis H3. The voter
turnout is de￿ned as the share of voters that participated in the elections out of total number
of voters entitled to vote in a given electoral district. As suggested by the model, ￿rms located
in the electoral districts with higher voter turnout are more likely to be supported and the data
seem to con￿rm this: the di⁄erence between supported and non-supported group is statistically
signi￿cant at 1% signi￿cance level (Table 4).
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The fourth prediction of the model implies that the supported ￿rms should be bigger in
terms of the number of employees than unsupported ￿rms. Table 5 empirically con￿rms this
prediction: I ￿nd statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence between the average number of employees in
two groups of ￿rms.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
According to H5, government interventions are expected to change the productivity distrib-
ution within the industry. First I estimate total factor productivity24 I plot the kernel density
for exporting and non-exporting producers to see the extent of the overlap at the beginning of
the sample period, namely in 2000 and at the end, in 2005. If initially exporting ￿rms seem to
outperform non-exporting ￿rms, overtime the gap between the two groups seem to disappear
(Figures 2 and 3). To disentangle the e⁄ect of the support I plot the productivity distributions
for four groups of ￿rms divided according to their export status and political support. As Figure
4 demonstrates, the productivity schedule for politically supported plants is reallocated to the
right, revealing a structural shift. Therefore, in the presence of subsidization or other forms
of state support, the TFP measure estimated as residual of the standard Cobb-Douglas func-
tion (with value added as dependent variable) might not re￿ ect true e¢ ciency, since ￿ supported
￿rms￿can have access to subsidized intermediate inputs decreasing in this way material costs
and in￿ ating valued added.
[Insert Figures 2, 3 and 4 about here]
To validate this ￿nding, I try to build a counterfactual to the existing situation by estimating
a hypothetical TFP for supported ￿rms as if it would be without political support. To this extent,
I ￿rst regress log TFP on a set of other performance indicators which are hypothesized to be
independent of the political support using only a subset of exporting ￿rms, which are not listed
in the ￿ experiment resolution￿ . I can directly use TFP and not an index because I am considering
only metallurgical ￿rms, hence I need only to control for time trend in productivity, which I do
by using year ￿xed e⁄ects. As before I use quantile regressions estimating the median e⁄ect for
the following speci￿cation.
24I estimate TFP using methodology of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) commonly used in the ￿rm-level studies.
16logTFPjt = ￿o + ￿1wjt + ￿2kjt + ￿3yjt + ￿1￿jt + ￿jt
where TFPjt is ￿rm j total factor productivity in level in year t
wjt is average wage paid by ￿rm j to its employees
kjt is capital per employee
yjt is output per employee
￿jt is pro￿t margin de￿ned as pro￿t (loss) before taxation divided by operating revenue /
turnover multiplied by 100
Three of these four performance measures are positively associated with productivity, while
capital intensity seems to be going against productivity. This ￿nding could be explained by the
fact that most plants are still using obsolete and ine¢ cient machinery and equipment.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Next, I get the predicted value of TFP conditional on the other indicators of ￿rm perfor-
mance. Below I report the predicted and earlier estimated mean values of log TFP as well as
the di⁄erence between the two.
Support Actual TFP Predicted TFP Di⁄erence
0 3.238 3.300 0.012
1 3.765 3.469 0.237
All 3.419 3.359 0.094
Even a ￿rst look at the predicted and actual values of TFP shows di⁄erences between the
two groups. To statistically validate this observation I use mean t-test (Table 7). First, I can
reject the null hypothesis that di⁄erences between actual and predicted TFP are the same for
two groups. In case of unsupported plants, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that means of the
predicted TFP and the actual TFP are the same; whereas for ￿ supported￿group the two means
are not equal according to t-test. This results holds even if I control for size of the ￿rm in the
counterfactual speci￿cation (Table 8). This gives support to my hypothesis that government
interventions alter the productivity ranking and, hence, conventionally estimated TFP is likely
to be biased in the presence of governmental interventions.
[Insert Table 7 & Table 8 about here]
Primarily the governmental support was given to large exporting ￿rms, however as Figure
4 demonstrates the productivity distribution of supported non-exporting ￿rms is also shifted to
the right relative to the unsupported non-exporting group. This result seems to suggest that
in this particular case the existing overlap of the two distributions may also be driven by the
governmental support to the non-exporting plants.
174 Concluding Remarks
Financial and economic crisis of 2008 saw major government interventions in many developed
and developing countries. Many ￿rms and companies received state support in various forms.
For example, automotive industry in the US got a major bailout in history since the Great
Depression.25 Current economic crisis re-emphasized the role of the government in the economy,
justifying even ￿ manual￿management of the economy. However, in a globalized world, state
support in one country may a⁄ect economic agents in other countries as well.
In this paper I propose a theoretical model motivated by the statistical analysis of ￿rm
performance in Ukrainian manufacturing. Although exporting seems to be on average associated
with better ￿rm level outcomes, di⁄erences between exporting and non-exporting ￿rms vary
across industries. An analysis of productivity distributions for the two groups shows that there
exist signi￿cant ranges of productivity where the two groups coexist, di⁄erently from the clear-
cut predictions of the theoretical models. I suggest a political economic explanation to this
￿nding. I build my work on a recent heterogenous ￿rm model developed by Melitz and Ottaviano
(2007) adding an electoral competition stage in order to endogenize trade policy. I test the
implications of the model on the data for the Ukrainian metallurgical sector, exploiting the
fact that I can identify in the Ukrainian legislation the ￿rms that receive some of kind of
government support. In line with theoretical prediction, I ￿nd that state-owned and larger
￿rms as well as ￿rms with more active voters are more likely to be favored by the government
policy. Government intervention is also hypothesized to change productivity distribution that
would prevail in a laissez-faire world. I ￿nd that conventionally estimated TFP does not seem
to capture actual e¢ ciency in the presence of government intervention.
Despite of the fact that the model is motivated by the ￿ndings from a transition economy my
work can be extended to the case of developed economies as the presence of politically connected
￿rms is a well-documented fact (Faccio, 2006).
Appendix
Stock Portfolio.




￿nWn(sn) + (￿iJ + ￿)VR (A1)





25General Motors and Chrysler received $17.4 billion in federal aid since December 2008. (NYT, "U.S. Lays
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Which is similar to the expression of the base model (9) and has the same implications for
the trade policy. However, in addition to the two parameters of the base model, there is also
parameter ￿, the share of stock of a proper plant in the workers￿portfolio. The higher this
parameters the more "favored" a plant is.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
 
Variable  Mean  SD  Obs 
Age  64.4  32.5  638 
Employees  4121  8824  638 
Output  577433  1488634  628 
Net sales  623018  1586149  636 
Value added  153943  464175  624 
Investment  14511.3  52624.8  456 
Machinery and equipment  183178  381529  635 


















































































































Table 2. Results of t-test on initial productivity for non-exporting firms, by subgroups 
 
    t-stat  p-value 
     
diff = mean(productivity if S=0) - mean(productivity if S=1)     
Ho: diff = 0    -1.6714  0.1044 
         24
Table 3. Results of t-test on State Ownership in 2000. 
 
    t-stat  p-value 
     
diff = mean(state-controlled if S=0) – mean(% state- controlled if S=1)   
Ho: diff = 0    -3.0924  0.0027 
     
mean(diff) = mean(state share, % if S=0 – state share, % if S=1)   




Table 4. Results of t-test on voter turnout by subgroups 
 
    t-stat  p-value 
     
diff = mean(turnout if S=0) - mean(turnout if S=1)     
Ho: diff = 0    -3.2207  0.0013 
       
 
 
Table 5. Results of t-test on firm size (number of employees) by subgroups 
 
    t-stat  p-value 
     
diff = mean(size if S=0) - mean(size if S=1)     
Ho: diff = 0    -4.2797  0.0001 
         25
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Table 6. Quantile Regression Results for the Unsupported Group of Exporters 
 
  Log TFP  Log TFP 
Average wage  0.730  0.559 
  (0.098)**  (0.127)** 
Capital per worker  -0.177  -0.297 
  (0.033)**  (0.045)** 
Output per worker  0.470  0.445 
  (0.042)**  (0.054)** 
Profit margin  0.012  0.009 
  (0.003)**  (0.004)* 
Size    0.140 
    (0.028)** 
Constant  -6.441  -4.531 
  (0.657)**  (0.867)** 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes 
Observations  164  164 
Pseudo R2   0.445  0.468 
   27
 
 
Table 7. Results of t-test on estimated and predicted TFP by subgroups 
 
    t-stat  p-value 
     
diff = mean(delta S=0) - mean(delta if S=1)     
Ho: diff = 0    -4.4272  0.0000 
       
mean(diff) = mean(actual TFP – predicted TFP)     
Ho: mean(diff) = 0  ALL  3.4567  0.0006 
  Unsupported  -0.2514  0.8018 
  Supported  5.9208  0.0000 
 
 
Table 8. Results of t-test on estimated and predicted TFP by subgroups controlling for size 
 
    t-stat  p-value 
     
diff = mean(delta S=0) - mean(delta if S=1)     
Ho: diff = 0    -2.8539  0.0046 
       
mean(diff) = mean(actual TFP – predicted TFP)     
Ho: mean(diff) = 0  ALL  1.3514  0.1773 
  Unsupported  -1.3159  0.1900 
  Supported  2.7969  0.0060 
 
 